Behind China's and India's different attitudes to international law lie China's semicolonial and India's colonial past. Indeed, Asia's colonial past is central to the many cartographic hangovers that have remained between China and India and China and its neighbours in the South China Sea. While India has adhered to the British colonial position since 1947, China has denounced colonial treaties since 1920. However, China and its publicists' acceptance of even post-colonial treaties, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is selective and political.
Introduction honourable relations between nations' and to '(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations'. When the Indian Constitution listed both 'treaty obligations' and 'international law', it essentially referred to international law's two primary sources-treaty and customary law-that the Indian state should respect. Adding further clarity, in the Rosiline George case, the Indian Supreme Court made plain that India had inherited the treaty obligations of the British Raj. 13 And, while India did honour some 627 treaties made by the British Indian administration, 14 the Indian court noted much later in the Abu Salem case, while accepting the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties as a customary law, that the 1978 convention implores states to look at the text of the relevant treaty that accompany change of sovereignty and then ascertain 'the intention of the State concerned as to the continuance or passing of any rights or obligations under the treaty concerned.' 15 However, Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, would denounce such colonial treaties in public speeches. 16 Clearly this Nehruvian sentiment was for political consumption alone. However, according to Judge Xue Hanqin, China's case, legally speaking, is one of change of government but without the loss of international personality. Therefore, she thinks that the normal change of government does not apply in China's case. 17 Thanks to
Wellington Koo, a diplomat and later a judge of the ICJ, China has actively used rebus sic stantibus since the 1920s to renegotiate colonial treaties. 18 The receding of the colonial tides between 1947 and 1949 exposed the cartographical differences between India and China in relation to the determination of the boundary between China and India-the McMahon Line. 19 While China has held on to rebus sic stantibus, the division of the Indian subcontinent defeated uti possidetis. Yet these Chinese and the Indian post-colonial moments did not entail a defeat of the Western conceptions of international law due to the political and structural constraints of state building. Little wonder, while the accepted definition of sovereignty is pre-colonial, its application through state practice is post-colonial both in quality and quantity. Judge Xue performance at the UN since 1971, like India's since 1947, has been two pronged: justifying ongoing national unification and Third World leadership.
The dichotomy between India's political and legal behaviour, perceived or actual, has meant that, as Professor Chimni points out, 'the principal dilemma of post-colonial international law scholars in India was to decide the extent to which post-colonial states should remain within the established boundaries of international law.' 29 More recently, Anthony
Carty and Fozia Lone also think that, whereas 'unequal treaties' fuelled the anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments in the Indian subcontinent, India has continued to adopt a positivist Western-style territorial sovereignty. 30 They have accused India of lacking 'originality in its approach to international law', in its persistence with 'the western approach', and in 'shy [ing] away from dealing with the real problems'. 31 Recently, China has made claims of 'historic rights' in the South China Sea. 32 In
December 2014, China claimed sovereignty over certain islands for exactly '2,000 years', a time period that perhaps cannot be understood with the lens of Western colonization at all. 33 Today, India thinks of itself not only as an ancient nation but also as a modern sover- The PRC almost always cites the five principles of peaceful co-existence in its political statements as well as in its statements before international courts and in bilateral statements. 42 In the Chinese position paper of December 2014 that was directed against the institution of arbitration by the Philippines for a dispute in the South China Sea, the PRC maintained that it was striving for a solution with respect to both 'disputes of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation' by way of, inter alia, 'negotiations on the basis of equality and the 
Sino-Indian Attitudes to International Law
ii. the 1954 Panchsheel Treaty's bilateralism, the politics of colonial maps, and the SinoIndian approach to international courts and adjudication; and iii. the Sino-Indian approach to the sources of international law.
The following sections examine, first, the construction of sovereignty by China and India since 1947-49 and, next, how the 1954 Panchsheel Treaty-a post-colonial, but edifying accord on peaceful coexistence between India and China-did not functionally help China and India co-exist peacefully. The Chinese monetary reform that devalued the Tibetan currency led to the down-spiralling of economic ties in the Tibet region, only to be overshadowed by the subsequent political hostilities and the eventual Sino-Indian war of 1962. 44 The next section of this article discusses the politics of maps in the post-colonial
Sino-Indian state building that expose the approach of both countries towards international law. The final section compares the approach of China and India to the sources of international law, both primary-treaties and customary law-and subsidiary. In order to do so, it is imperative to discuss the South China Sea dispute on maritime boundaries (treaties) and the claims of 'historic' right therein as well as the ongoing Sino-Indian boundary settlement efforts (customary law).
The value and role of history in international disputes: a comparison of the Sino-Indian construction of sovereignty After the Second World War, the UN Charter intended to organize the life of Western and developing countries alike, but with five powerful nations, including China, in the UN Security Council. A diplomatic communiqué of 1958 exposes the reality of the UN as a highly political body with a Western core-the UN Security Council-and a non-Western periphery-the UN General Assembly. The Portuguese Permanent Representative to the UN said to the Australian diplomat Sir Owen Dixon, UN Representative for India and Pakistan, that on the Goa question 'a majority of the Council would be in sympathy with the Portuguese, whereas in the General Assembly things might go against the Portuguese'. 53 The PRC has been a member of the UN Security Council since 1971 and, thus, is a privileged Asian nation that ought to lead by example.
In 1961 However, while India was rejecting the contentions of Portugal, a colonial power, China's opposition today is to the Philippines, a product of Spanish, American, and Japanese colonialism. This makes all the difference when China has itself sought to offer a legal meaning to colonialism in its Kosovo statement. However, scholars drew an analogy between Nehru's rejection of Zhou Enlai's condemnation of the imperialist McMahon Line, with India's contention 'that no vestiges of colonial rule should remain on their territory' in relation to Portuguese possession.
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Not long afterwards, the issue of territorial division would come before the Indian courts in the Berubari opinion. In this case, which the Indian Supreme Court delivered fortuitously the year the ICJ ruled in the Right of Passage case-the Court essayed that the Indian Constitution allows for the integration of disparate territory 'not in pursuance of any expansionist political philosophy but mainly for providing for the integration and absorption of Indian territories.' 58 A decade later, in pointed contrast to the Berubari opinion of Justice Gajendragadkar, Chief Justice Hidayatullah authored a stronger post-colonial, if not a nationalist, view of international law in the Monterio case, saying that 'events after the Second World War have shown that transfer of title to territory by conquest is still recognized'. If 'cession after defeat can create title', Justice Hidayatullah stated, 'occupation combined with absence of opposition must lead to the same kind of title.' 59 
Sino-Indian
the PRC concludes or accedes to any international treaty that contains provisions differing from the PRC's civil laws, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are ones on which the PRC has announced reservations. 71 According to Zhongqi Pan, the Chinese views on sovereignty can be categorized into four aspects. 72 The PRC:
• prefers to interpret sovereignty as an entitled right;
• prefers to see sovereignty as inseparable and non-transferable;
• asserts that the principle of sovereignty remains the guiding principle of international relations; and
• holds sovereignty dear as the mother principle that directs China's foreign policy.
Chinese scholars claim that in the PRC sovereignty and the rule of law have reached a synthesis since its admission to the UN in 1971. 73 Indeed, the UN has blended the idea of territorial sovereignty with the equality of states so that the UN has become more than the sum of its parts. law. For example, in the Maganbhai case, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that unless Indian law is in conflict with an international treaty, the treaty must stand.
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At the time, Narayana Rao argued that although 'treaty making is an executive function, it is not exclusively so under principles of modern constitutional law'. 79 Rao attempted to show 'that the Indian Parliament has the right, authority and competence to participate in the treaty making function through the process of prior approval of treaties.' 80 It is an agreed precept of law in India that if, in consequence of the exercise of the executive power, rights of the citizens or others are restricted or infringed or laws are modified, the exercise of power must be supported by legislation in the Indian Parliament. 81 And the Indian courts have the power to decide the nature of an executive decree. Even so, India places an equal emphasis on sovereignty. 82 Justice Chinnappa Reddy in the Gramophone Company case examined 'whether international law is, of its own force, drawn into the law of the land . . . overrides municipal law in case of [a] conflict.' 83 He asserted that when municipal and international law run into conflict, 'the sovereignty and the integrity of the Republic and the supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making the laws may not be subjected to external rules except to the extent legitimately accepted by the constituted legislatures themselves.'
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The Indian courts are emboldened by the fact that, from time to time, the Indian executive consults the court for legal opinions on sovereign matters. For example, in the Berubari opinion, which was an opinion given by the Indian Supreme Court on a request by the then Indian president, the Court said that foreign agreements and conventions could be made applicable to the municipal laws in India upon suitable legislation by Parliament in this regard. The Indian Supreme Court in Berubari gave a judicial interpretation of Indian sovereignty:
[I]t is an essential attribute of sovereignty that a sovereign state can acquire foreign territory and can, in case of necessity, cede a part of its territory in favour of a foreign State, and this can be done in exercise of its treaty-making power. Cession of national territory in law amounts to the transfer of sovereignty over the said territory by the owner-State in favour of another State. ... Stated broadly the treaty-making power would have to be exercised in the manner contemplated by the Constitution and subject to the limitations imposed by it. Whether the treaty made can be implemented by ordinary legislation or by constitutional amendment will naturally depend on the provisions of the Constitution itself. In India, the courts are not only the arbiters between international law and domestic laws, but they are also extremely progressive in applying international conventions to which India might not even be a party. As such, the Indian courts have frequently consulted the corpus of international treaties to import international legal norms to strengthen local norms. 88 However, at the same time, the Indian Supreme Court is judiciously cautious in that, 'if the [P]arliament has made any legislation which is in conflict with international law, then Indian Courts are bound to give effect to the Indian Law'. 90 Nevertheless, in the 'absence of a contrary legislation, municipal courts in India would respect the rules of international law.' 91 The Indian approach to international law envisages the strong role of the Indian judiciary to the question of international legal obligations and sovereignty.
The China-India dogfight since 1954
In 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Treaty. 92 It is said to incorporate the five principles of peaceful co-existence, which China uses rather frequently as her way of handling international relations. Between 1956 and 1964, the Indian government published white papers reproducing the notes, memoranda, and letters exchanged between India and China from 1954 onwards. 93 The white papers are an accurate window into the ensuing dogfight between China and India that expose the mistrust between the two governments on some of the most basic issues of international law, not the least of which is the value of the Panchsheel Treaty as a legal text as opposed to a political statement. 94 Soon after the signing of this bilateral treaty, some of the issues on which both the governments began to differ were, inter alia, a lack of good faith in the treatment accorded to the Indian trade agencies in Tibet, the treatment of the Indian consul General in Lhasa, 95 the treatment of Chinese Trade Agencies in India, 96 the privileges offered to the Chinese missions whether reciprocal or equal with other foreign missions, 97 and state responsibility. 98 Of these issues, the devaluation of the Tibetan currency, causing loss to Indian businessmen dealing in the Tibetan currency, led to enriching discussions on the issues of treaty violation vis-à-vis the 1954 Panchsheel Treaty and customary international law, international law's primary sources. India made a request of the Chinese government that 'the customary practice should be allowed to continue and that arbitrary measures, such as, for example, demands for the exchange of currencies already held by the Indian traders should not be enforced.' 102 Since
Indian traders had no previous intimation of the new orders relating to currency in the Tibet region, India argued that they may be allowed to take with them the accumulated reserve of Tibetan coins or Chinese silver dollars. 103 China replied that 'monetary measures are matters within the scope of a country's sovereignty'. 104 An acrimonious exchange followed. China accused India of not understanding correctly the great significance of China's currency reform, to which an unimpressed India gave the name 'monetary manipulation'. 105 Between the two operative currencies-Chinese paper currency and Tibetan currency-the devaluation of only the latter vis-à -vis the Chinese paper currency did not impact the holders of the Chinese currency. However, it left the holder of the Tibetan currency poorer. Rama Rao considered such action to be a 'patent case of economic aggression'.
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India accused the PRC of a lack of good faith in adhering to the 1954 Treaty almost in a way that was similar to China's accusation of the Philippines' lack of good faith in failing to keep the South China Sea issues bilateral, citing Sino-Philippine agreements and the 1954 Panchsheel Treaty.
107 Thus, the 1954 Panchsheel Treaty, often projected notionally as an Asian approach to international law, is functionally overstated. During the Panchsheel Treaty negotiations, Nehru wrote to the Chinese premier that '[n]o border questions were raised' and that India was 'under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries.' 108 Nehru, who was also a lawyer trained in the West, took the Treaty to be legal in the Western legal sense. For China, it simply was-and continues to remain so in 2015-a political document for bargaining bilaterally and not a treaty that would be subjected to interpretations by international courts. Nehru surely over-evaluated the importance of the Panchsheel Treaty when he said 'we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement, which was happily concluded in 1954, had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.' Himalayan range, but apart from this, in most points, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Governments of India and the Central Government of China.' 119 The Chinese agreements with Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan (occupied Ladakh) all followed the watershed principle along the Himalayas and were consistent with the topographical flow of the agreed boundary in Sikkim and the McMahon Line in Arunachal. China argued that in Arunachal alone this flow was broken.
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More specifically, the question of Tawang and China's reluctance to adhere to the watershed in Arunanchal Pradesh came up. If China claimed that Arunachal Pradesh was a southern part of the Tibet Autonomous Region, then India could not, within the meaning of the 1954 Agreement, accept that Tibet was within China. 121 India's formal position on Tibet, which was articulated in 1954 and then again in 2003, was 'a tentative and unilateral diplomatic offer that can only be sustained and the circle completed once China recognizes Arunachal as part of India.' 123 Second, it was also notable that during negotiations with India, China 'kept circulating old maps that made sweeping claims based on old imperial conquests, it did not pursue them during the negotiations and finally settled for a more limited territorial adjustments.' 124 Third, maps have also become central in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The PRC's notion of its sovereign territory since ancient times, now advanced though various maps and the nine-dotted line, has been the reason behind some of the newer disputes in the South China Sea. In May 2009, the Chinese government communicated two notes verbale to the UN Secretary-General requesting that they be circulated to all UN member States. The map referred to in China's note verbale depicted nine line segments (dashes) encircling waters, islands, and other features of the South China Sea. If the PRC accepted the position previously taken by the Republic of China in the South China Sea, China would then step into India's shoes in accepting the McMahon Line drawn by the British during the colonial period. More particularly, Zhihua Zheng has stated that during the Second World War, the South China Sea:
and all islands to its south, and directly controlled French Indochina and the Kingdom of Siam. 125 Just as 'Japan's attitude to the ownership of the South China Sea islands after the World War II has particular implications in international law, and can, to a large measure, reflect the original ownership of these islands', Britain's ownership of India and the drawing up of the boundary 'can, to a large measure, reflect the original ownership' and authoritative drawing of the boundary. As such, China's strategic use of ancient history and maps drawn up by the ROC and the nine-dash line that was delivered to the UN in 2009 on the South China Sea might allow China's neighbours to accuse it of cartographic aggression today.
Third party arbitration of Sino-Indian disputes and courts and tribunals In May 2015, a China-India joint statement 'acknowledged the positive role of the Agreements and Protocols' signed between the two countries 'so far in maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas'. 144 The declaration reaffirmed the common determination to seek a 'political settlement of the boundary question'. 145 153 India had accused Portugal of not complying 'with the rule of customary international law requiring her to undertake diplomatic negotiation' before starting the dispute. 154 Although their arguments were the same, China and India quoted different sources; while the former cited the existence of a treaty with the Philippines, India invoked customary international law. 155 Notably, both treaties and customary law are primary sources of international law, but not for China. While, within international law, custom and treaties are both seen as primary sources, 'China puts the first two primary sources in a hierarchical structure; that is to say, international treaties are followed by international custom'. 156 In many Chinese laws, the term international law, colonial treaties, and the allegedly non-exhaustive customary law of the UNCLOS allows China to move to 'historic titles', which many say is China's policy of 'strategic ambiguity'. 166 Others maintain that the 'vagueness of the legal terminology' by the PRC 'raises the issue of whether that very vagueness is being used as an element of political strategy'. 167 The UNCLOS leaves no historic residual rights 'that China could rely upon to support a claim to jurisdiction over natural resources in and under water inside the nine-dash line'. 168 As said before, China jettisons colonial treaties as bad sources and considers customary law to be inferior to treaty law. Building on that, Chinese publicists today argue for a de novo void in postcolonial treaties, like the UNCLOS, which they think constitutes an 'open invitation for customary law to fill' gaps that favour China. 169 A leading proponent of this view, Bing Bing Jia, maintains that 'separateness' of these two primary sources of international law, custom and treaty law, 'is at times blurred, but shall always be maintained'. 170 However, while China questions primary sources of international law, in the Kosovo affair it alluded to the decision of the Canadian domestic court, a subsidiary source of law.
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This is strategic as well as symbolic because the Chinese settlement policy in Tibet and Canada's policy in Québec is similar in opposition to India's in Kashmir. 172 Notably, India has defined its territory explicitly using the UNCLOS. 173 In Italy v India, India -Importation of Certain Agricultural Product is significantly different from its view in Italy v India, where India did not take the UNCLOS to be the primary law. The difference is that while in the latter case India was arguing before its domestic court, in the former case it was arguing before an international court.
Conclusion
In 2015, both China and India found themselves in a bind before international courts in relation to the UNCLOS against the Philippines and Italy respectively. Like China in the South China Sea case, India is expected to make the arguments of sovereignty in the Enrica Lexie case. party in nature. Yet China does not show faith in third party dispute resolution of its own disputes.
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And China's approach is not wrong. Why drag a matter to a court in a faraway land and pay a heavy fee for litigation? However, what if this is the only option left to smaller nations in order to stop powerful nations riding roughshod over them. A majority of the countries that sit in the UN General Assembly have their claims of sovereignty based completely on decolonization-induced post-colonialism and not on historic titles deriving from the ancien régime. China's 'historic title' argument has started a line of arguments where, unwittingly, China lends itself to critique since its use of history ranges from 100 years in the Simla Agreement of 1914 to 2,000 years in the South China Sea dispute. Can India rub off on China? This question might seem patronizing as it assumes India to be more compliant of international law than China is. However, with the exception of human rights issues, compliance of international law today is simply a statistical question.
